Making Pet Trusts Instruments of Settlors and Not of Courts by unknown
  
[385] 
Comment 
ASHLEY GLASSMAN∗ 
Making Pet Trusts Instruments of 
Settlors and Not of Courts 
eona Helmsley is a memorable name in this country: an icon of 
wealth, luxury, greed, and seemingly un-American values toward 
family and pets.  While she punished alleged slights against her to an 
unusual degree—outright denying several grandchildren a single 
penny in her will—she also rewarded loyalty and companionship, 
even if only from her Maltese, to an equally unusual degree.  
Helmsley may have felt that her family, friends, and government were 
only after her money, but she certainly did not feel that way about her 
dog, Trouble.  It is for this reason that Helmsley sought to ensure that 
Trouble lived luxuriously even after her death, leaving $12 million for 
Trouble’s care in an enforceable pet trust.1  Despite hiring expensive 
lawyers capable of creating flawless donative documents, Helmsley’s 
wishes were not followed when a surrogate judge in New York was 
able to legally hack Trouble’s trust from $12 million down to $2 
million.2 
This story, though unusual, should raise concern in all Americans 
who rely on the courts to enforce their wills or trusts, especially those 
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1 Gerry W. Beyer, Leona Helmsley’s Will—A Detailed Analysis, WILLS, TRUSTS & 
ESTATES PROF BLOG (Aug. 30, 2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/trusts_estates 
_prof/2007/08/leona-helmsle-2.html. 
2 Stephanie Strom, Helmsley Left Dogs Billions in Her Will, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/us/02gift.html. 
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who plan to bequeath assets to their beloved family pets.  What 
permitted a judge to override Helmsley’s wishes was the trust’s 
excess funds provision3—a provision that exists in more than half of 
the country’s pet trust statutes and allows courts to decrease the 
amount of money left in trust for an animal after the settlor passes 
away.  Both state legislatures and the Uniform Law Commission 
could easily remove the excess funds provision from state pet trust 
statutes and the uniform codes where it originated. 
This Comment examines how the Uniform Law Commission can 
essentially eradicate the excess funds provision from state statutes 
simply by amending the uniform pet trust statutes (specifically section 
408 of the Uniform Trust Code and section 2-907 of the Uniform 
Probate Code).  Due to the influence the Commission’s codes have on 
state legislatures when drafting statutes, such a change will certainly 
trickle down throughout the states, whether or not each state has 
adopted the uniform code’s pet trust statute.  Part I of this Comment 
discusses how pet trusts generally operate and describes the kinds of 
pet trusts that can be implemented in most states.  Part II describes the 
Uniform Law Commission, the creation of the Uniform Trust Code 
and the Uniform Probate Code, and the effect those codes have on 
statutory pet trusts.  Part III analyzes section 408 of the Uniform Trust 
Code and section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate Code—two uniform 
sections that have had the greatest effect on state pet trust statutes.  
Part III also describes a typical excess funds provision. 
Part IV analyzes the four main reasons the excess funds provision 
should be removed from uniform laws.  First, the provision 
undermines the general attitude of established trusts and estates law in 
the United States.  Second, the settlor is in a better position than a 
court to determine what funds are necessary to satisfy the intended 
use of the trust that the settlor created.  Third, the provision could 
deter use of pet trusts because it decreases the likelihood that the 
settlor’s wishes for his property will be followed.  And fourth, the 
provision furthers an outdated attitude toward companion animals that 
studies reveal most Americans now disagree with. 
 
3 Frances Carlisle, Helmsley Pet Trust Helps Highlight Issues for Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., 
May 29, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202431060568. 
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I 
WHAT IS A PET TRUST? 
A trust is a legal entity that consists of parties in a fiduciary 
relationship regarding some specified property.4  There are three 
typical parties to a trust.  The settlor is the party who creates the 
trust,5 chooses the beneficiaries, and often provides the property for 
which the trust is set up to disburse.  The trustee is the party who 
holds the legal interest in the trust property, manages the property, 
and disburses it to the beneficiaries per the settlor’s wishes.6  The 
beneficiary is the party who has the beneficial interest in the trust 
property.7  A key aspect of trusts is that the trustee owes fiduciary 
duties to the beneficiary, such as a duty not to profit at the expense of 
the beneficiary8 and a duty to segregate the trust property.9  These 
parties are not always different people; for example, a beneficiary or a 
settlor may also serve as the trustee in most circumstances.10 
While pet trusts retain the standard roles of settlor, trustee, and 
beneficiary, there are several issues that arise exclusively with pet 
trusts.  First, someone must care for the pet when the settlor has 
passed away, often leading to an additional party called a caretaker.11  
The caretaker is usually someone who is familiar with the pet 
(perhaps a family member) and is willing to provide food, care, and 
veterinarian services throughout the animal’s life.12  However, a pet 
trust might not include a caretaker if, for example, the trustee is 
willing to care for the pet.  Second, there is the issue of who will be 
the beneficiary—the pet or the caretaker?  This question is often 
decided based upon the type of pet trust the settlor chooses and the 
 
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). 
5 Id. § 3(1). 
6 Id. § 3(3). 
7 Id. § 3(4). 
8 Id. § 2 cmt. b (stating that a fiduciary cannot profit from matters within the scope of 
the fiduciary relationship unless permitted by a court or the terms of an arrangement 
between the parties). 
9 JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1079 (2d ed. 2003). 
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 cmt. c.  But see id. § 3 cmt. d (stating that a 
sole trustee may not be the sole beneficiary). 
11 See J. Alan Jensen & Margaret A. Vining, The Oregon Pet Trust: The Statute, 
Drafting Considerations and Related Issues, in ESTATE PLANNING FOR PETS: SPONSORED 
BY THE OREGON STATE BAR ANIMAL LAW SECTION 3 (2009), available at 
www.oregonanimallaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/8.pdf. 
12 Breahn Vokolek, America Gets What It Wants: Pet Trusts and a Future for Its 
Companion Animals, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1109, 1128 (2008). 
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jurisdiction in which the trust is set up.  Because an animal cannot 
hold legal title to property (as animals themselves are considered 
property), a pet can only be a valid beneficiary when authorized by 
statute. 
Third, if the caretaker is the chosen beneficiary instead of the pet, a 
concern arises about whether the caretaker is then incentivized to 
spend as little money on the pet as possible and keep the remaining 
funds for personal use.  Because of this concern, pet trusts can entail a 
second additional party: the trust protector.  A trust protector is a 
party who can further enforce the terms of the trust.13  The trust 
protector simply provides an additional check, but it is not required.14  
One situation when a trust protector might be beneficial is when the 
settlor leaves the animal in the care of a nonfamily member or 
someone not emotionally connected to the pet.  A settlor in San 
Francisco, for example, left her black cat to the care of her 
housekeeper and designated her as the trustee in the pet trust.15  After 
the housekeeper inconsistently stated the cat’s age, authorities learned 
that the housekeeper had replaced the black cat two times as a way to 
continue drawing on the funds of the trust.16  In this situation, the cat 
could have been microchipped, and a trust protector could have been 
instructed to confirm the identity of the cat every few years.  As this 
example reveals, a trust protector might be necessary only in narrow 
circumstances. 
There are two types of pet trusts: (1) common law or traditional pet 
trusts and (2) statutory pet trusts.  There are advantages and 
disadvantages to both types; however, in some states, parties do not 
have the choice of a statutory pet trust.  States without a pet trust 
statute include Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, and West Virginia.17  Traditional pet trusts, however, 
exist in all fifty states.18 
 
13 Jensen & Vining, supra note 11, at 3. 
14 Id. 
15 GERRY W. BEYER, ESTATE PLANNING FOR NON-HUMAN FAMILY MEMBERS 11–12 
(2010) (citing Torri Still, This Attorney Is for the Birds, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), 
Mar. 22, 1999, at 4), available at http://www.professorbeyer.com/Articles/Pet_Trusts_6    
-04-2010.pdf. 
16 Id. at 11. 
17 Georgia and Oklahoma did not have pet trust statutes until 2010.  GA. CODE ANN. § 
53-12-28 (West 2010) (Georgia); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 199 (2010) (Oklahoma).  
Massachusetts currently has a potential pet trust statute that is making its way through the 
legislature: Bill 1467.  See Bills Underway, THE 186TH GEN. CT. OF THE 
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A.  Traditional Trusts 
Traditional trusts follow common law and permit a pet owner to 
create a trust for a pet’s caregiver (the beneficiary), requiring the 
trustee to distribute money to the caregiver to cover the pet’s 
expenses.19  To be an enforceable trust, the beneficiary must be a 
“person,” which means the beneficiary could legally be a corporation 
but not an animal.20  As noted earlier, this is because an animal 
cannot hold legal title to property, as animals are themselves 
property.21  A traditional trust that designates an animal as the 
beneficiary is deemed an honorary trust when the trustee can agree to 
enforce the trust provisions but is not required to.22  Historically, 
American courts have refused to enforce trusts with animal 
beneficiaries for several reasons other than the animals’ inability to 
hold title: (1) animals are not humans, so there is no “measuring life” 
for the purpose of the rule against perpetuities (RAP);23 (2) animals 
do not have standing to sue in court if the trustees do not satisfy their 
fiduciary duties toward the beneficiaries;24 and (3) in the 1970s, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) invalidated for tax purposes all trusts 
with nonhuman beneficiaries because nonhumans are not taxable 
under the Internal Revenue Code.25 
B.  Statutory Trusts 
Statutory pet trusts exist in forty-four states and were created to 
allow trusts with a nonhuman beneficiaries.  Only Wisconsin’s pet 
trust statute is honorary, meaning it guides the formation of a pet trust 
but holds it legally unenforceable.26  States began implementing pet 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/Details/5964 (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2010). 
18 Jonathan P. Wilkerson, A “Purr”fect Amendment: Why Congress Should Amend the 
Internal Revenue Code to Apply the Charitable Remainder Exception to Pet Trusts, 41 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 591 (2009). 
19 Gerry W. Beyer & Jonathan P. Wilkerson, Max’s Taxes: A Tax-Based Analysis of Pet 
Trusts, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1219, 1221–22 (2009). 
20 Michael A. Ogline, Trusts for the Care of Animals: Estate Planning Goes to the 
Dogs, 18 OHIO PROB. L.J. 9, 9 (2007). 
21 GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 41 (1995). 
22 Wilkerson, supra note 18, at 592. 
23 Beyer & Wilkerson, supra note 19, at 1221. 
24 Id. 
25 Rev. Rul. 76-486, 1976-2 C.B. 192. 
26 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11 (West 2009). 
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trust statutes as a way to overcome many of the common law issues 
regarding nonhuman beneficiaries.  For example, many statutes allow 
the pet trust to exist for the length of the animal’s life, which can be 
longer than the RAP would allow.27  Many statutes also permit parties 
other than the nonhuman beneficiary to enforce the trust including: 
(1) a person designated for that purpose, (2) a person designated by 
the court, or (3) any person interested in the welfare of the animal.28  
This move away from common law pet trusts was motivated in large 
part by the formation of the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform 
Trust Code. 
II 
UNIFORM CODES WRITTEN BY THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION 
A.  How the Uniform Law Commission Works 
The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is a state governmental 
association that drafts uniform state laws in areas where national 
uniformity would be beneficial.29  The ULC comprises 
commissioners from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.30  After an intensive writing and 
review process that spans many years,31 the ULC publishes uniform 
acts or codes in numerous areas of law and encourages all states to 
adopt them in their entirety.32  The uniform acts and codes as 
published by the ULC do not become law, however, until they are 
adopted by a state’s legislature.33  The rate of adoption varies widely 
depending on the area of law. 
 
27 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 19-3B-408(a) (2010). 
28 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212(c) (West 2010). 
29 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Frequently Asked Questions 
About the Uniform Law Commission, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ 
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=61 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter 
NCCUSL, Frequently Asked Questions]. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Introduction, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2010).  When referencing uniform codes, the term “state” includes the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
33 Id. 
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B.  The Effect the UPC and UTC Have on Statutory Pet Trusts 
The uniform acts and codes published by the ULC are often 
extremely persuasive to state legislatures.  While some adopt an entire 
code (with minor modifications), many make substantial changes or 
adopt only certain sections.  The Uniform Probate Code (UPC), for 
example, has been adopted in full or in part by additional states every 
year since it was first published in 1969, especially in the years 
following major amendments to the code.  When the 1990 
amendments to the UPC included a pet trust provision, it greatly 
influenced states’ transitions from traditional pet trusts to statutory pet 
trusts.34  Through 2010, twenty states have adopted the UPC in its 
entirety,35 and roughly the same number of states have drafted their 
state pet trust statute based on the code language.  While the majority 
of states did not initially adopt the UPC’s pet trust statute, the UPC 
did plant the seed that states could create their own statutes that 
avoided many problems arising under common law.  The UPC’s pet 
trust statute, section 2-907, made such trusts enforceable rather than 
honorary when the beneficiary is an animal.36  The real impetus for 
statutory pet trusts, however, came about with the Uniform Trust 
Code (UTC) ten years later.37  Because the statutes are conceptually 
similar, it is not clear why the UTC pet trust provision was better 
received.  Most likely, enforceable pet trusts were simply more 
palatable to states after they had been in existence for up to ten years 
in some jurisdictions. 
The UTC has been and continues to be very influential.  Eighteen 
states and Washington, D.C., have enacted the pet trust section of the 
UTC, section 408, word for word.38  Two additional states chose to 
 
34 Beyer & Wilkerson, supra note 19, at 1222. 
35 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the . . . 
Uniform Probate Code, UNIF. L. COMM’RS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact 
_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upc.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter A Few Facts 
About the . . . Uniform Probate Code]. 
36 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (amended 1993). 
37 Beyer & Wilkerson, supra note 19, at 1223. 
38 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-408 (2010) (Alabama); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10408 
(2010) (Arizona); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-408 (West 2010) (Arkansas); D.C. CODE § 
19-1304.08 (2010) (District of Columbia); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0408 (West 2010) 
(Florida); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-2-18 (West 2010) (Indiana); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-
408 (West 2009) (Kansas); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 408 (2009) (Maine); MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-112 (West 2010) (Maryland); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-
408 (West 2010) (Missouri); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3834 (2009) (Nebraska); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-408 (2010) (New Hampshire); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-4-408 
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combine the language of section 408 of the UTC with some non-code 
language.39  In contrast, ten states have chosen to enact the pet trust 
section of the UPC, section 2-907, word for word.40  An additional 
eight states have pet trust statutes that combine the language of 
section 2-907 of the UPC with some non-code language.41  Three 
states combined language from the UPC with language from the UTC 
to create their pet trust statutes.42 
What these numbers show is that the UPC and the UTC have been 
extremely influential in how state legislatures draft their pet trust 
statutes, regardless of whether each state actually adopts the uniform 
code entirely or even the pet trust section itself.  Of the forty-four 
states that have a statute allowing for pet trusts, only three states’ pet 
trust statutes do not track code language (UPC or UTC).43  It is for 
this reason that any widespread changes within pet trust statutes are 
most likely to occur through the ULC, where the changes will 
percolate down to the states regardless of whether they have formally 
adopted the affected section. 
 
(West 2010) (New Mexico); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 59-12-08 (West 2009) (North 
Dakota); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5804.08 (West 2010) (Ohio); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7738 (West 2010) (Pennsylvania); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-408 (2009) (South Carolina); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 408 (West 2010) (Vermont); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-409 
(West 2010) (Wyoming). 
39 TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-408 (West 2010) (Tennessee); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 
112.037 (West 2009) (Texas). 
40 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.907 (West 2010) (Alaska); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
15-11-901 (West 2010) (Colorado); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:7-501 (West 2009) (Hawaii); 
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15.2 (West 2010) (Illinois); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
700.2722 (West 2010) (Michigan); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-1017 (2009) (Montana); 
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1 (McKinney 2010) (New York); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 36C-4-408 (West 2009) (North Carolina); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1-21 
to -23 (2010) (South Dakota); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1001 (West 2010) (Utah). 
41 CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212 (West 2009) (California); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-
489a (West 2010) (Connecticut); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3555 (West 2010) (Delaware); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28 (West 2010) (Georgia); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:11-38 (West 
2010) (New Jersey); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 199 (2010) (Oklahoma); OR. REV. STAT. § 
130.185 (2009) (Oregon); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.118.005 to .110 (West 2010) 
(Washington). 
42 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.0075 (West 2009) (Nevada); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4-
23-1 (West 2009) (Rhode Island); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-544.08 (West 2010) (Virginia). 
43 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-601 (West 2010) (Idaho); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.2105 
(West 2010) (Iowa); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11 (West 2009) (Wisconsin). 
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III 
THE CODES’ PET TRUST SECTIONS 
A.  Section 408 of the UTC 
Section 408 of the UTC plainly and succinctly validates 
noncharitable, honorary trusts that have an animal beneficiary.44  The 
text of section 408 provides: 
(a)  A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal 
alive during the settlor’s lifetime.  The trust terminates upon the 
death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the 
care of more than one animal alive during the settlor’s lifetime, 
upon the death of the last surviving animal. 
(b)  A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person 
appointed in the terms of the trust or, if no person is so appointed, 
by a person appointed by the court.  A person having an interest in 
the welfare of the animal may request the court to appoint a person 
to enforce the trust or to remove a person appointed. 
(c)  Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied 
only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines 
that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for 
the intended use.  Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the 
trust, property not required for the intended use must be distributed 
to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor’s successors in 
interest.45 
The section states that a trust is enforceable until the death of the 
last surviving animal,46 allowing such a trust to exceed the RAP’s 
twenty-one-year time limit, which will often occur with certain 
animals like camels (who live more than fifty years) and parrots (who 
can live more than seventy years).47  Because an animal beneficiary 
cannot enforce his rights in a court of law, the section allows for three 
different parties to possibly enforce the terms of the trust on behalf of 
the animal: (1) a person appointed in the trust, (2) a person appointed 
by the court, or (3) a person who has an indirect interest in the welfare 
of the animal.48  A person with an interest in the welfare of the animal 
can indirectly enforce the trust by requesting that the court appoint 
someone to enforce the trust or remove a person who is already 
 
44 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 cmt. (2006). 
45 Id. § 408(a)–(c). 
46 Id. § 408(a). 
47 Jensen & Vining, supra note 11, at 2. 
48 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(b). 
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appointed.49  Allowing a person with an interest in the welfare of the 
animal to indirectly enforce the trust encourages the settlor to include 
a trust protector who will serve that exact function if necessary.  
Furthermore, the section limits the property of the trust to its intended 
use and explains the method of distribution of trust property that is 
not required for the intended use.50  Compared to common law, the 
clarity and enforceability of section 408 makes pet trusts more 
appealing to pet owners. 
B.  Section 2-907 of the UPC 
Section 2-907 of the UPC is conceptually similar to the UTC pet 
trust section, but it is even more detailed.  The text of section 2-907 
provides: 
(a)  [Honorary Trust.]  Subject to subsection (c), if (i) a trust is for a 
specific lawful noncharitable purpose or for lawful noncharitable 
purposes to be selected by the trustee and (ii) there is no definite or 
definitely ascertainable beneficiary designated, the trust may be 
performed by the trustee for [21] years but no longer, whether or 
not the terms of the trust contemplate a longer duration. 
(b)  [Trust for Pets.]  Subject to this subsection and subsection (c), a 
trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid.  
The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust.  
A governing instrument must be liberally construed to bring the 
transfer within this subsection, to presume against the merely 
precatory or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the 
general intent of the transferor.  Extrinsic evidence is admissible in 
determining the transferor’s intent. 
(c)  [Additional Provisions Applicable to Honorary Trusts and 
Trusts for Pets.]  In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) or 
(b), a trust covered by either of those subsections is subject to the 
following provisions: 
(1)  Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument, 
no portion of the principal or income may be converted to the use of 
the trustee or to any use other than for the trust’s purposes or for the 
benefit of a covered animal. 
(2)  Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended 
trust property in the following order: 
(i)   as directed in the trust instrument; 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. § 408(c). 
 2010] Making Pet Trusts Instruments of Settlors & Not of Courts 395 
(ii) if the trust was created in a nonresiduary clause in the 
transferor’s will or in a codicil to the transferor’s will, under the 
residuary clause in the transferor’s will; and 
(iii) if no taker is produced by the application of subparagraph (i) or 
(ii), to the transferor’s heirs under Section 2-711. 
(3)  For the purposes of Section 2-707, the residuary clause is 
treated as creating a future interest under the terms of a trust. 
(4)  The intended use of the principal or income can be enforced by 
an individual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument or, 
if none, by an individual appointed by a court upon application to it 
by an individual. 
(5)  Except as ordered by the court or required by the trust 
instrument, no filing, report, registration, periodic accounting, 
separate maintenance of funds, appointment, or fee is required by 
reason of the existence of the fiduciary relationship of the trustee. 
(6)  A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred, if it 
determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount 
required for the intended use.  The amount of the reduction, if any, 
passes as unexpended trust property under subsection (c)(2). 
(7)  If no trustee is designated or no designated trustee is willing or 
able to serve, a court shall name a trustee.  A court may order the 
transfer of the property to another trustee, if required to assure that 
the intended use is carried out and if no successor trustee is 
designated in the trust instrument or if no designated successor 
trustee agrees to serve or is able to serve.  A court may also make 
such other orders and determinations as shall be advisable to carry 
out the intent of the transferor and the purpose of this section.51 
The statute validates pet trusts with a nonhuman beneficiary and 
disregards the RAP.52  But it also stipulates that any “governing 
instrument must be liberally construed” so as to bring it within the 
provisions of the section that presume an enforceable status over an 
honorary status.53  It includes specific directions on how to transfer 
unexpended trust property once the trust is terminated54 and gives the 
court direction on what to do if the trust does not designate a trustee 
or if a designated trustee is unable to serve.55  The single component 
that section 2-907 of the UPC lacks that is included in section 408 of 
 
51 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (amended 1993). 
52 Id. § 2-907(b). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. § 2-907(c)(2). 
55 Id. § 2-907(c)(7). 
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the UTC is the ability of a party who has an interest in the welfare of 
the animal to indirectly enforce the trust in a court of law.56 
C.  The Excess Funds Provision 
Unfortunately, one provision that both section 408 of the UTC and 
section 2-907 of the UPC contain is an excess funds provision that is 
detrimental to the law of pet trusts in the United States.  An excess 
funds provision permits a court to determine the amount of trust 
property that is required for the intended use and compare that to the 
amount of funds actually left in trust.  Any funds the settlor left in 
excess of the amount the court determines is necessary to satisfy the 
intended purpose will be distributed to other parties. 
For example, if a settlor left $100,000 for the care of his pet, a 
court is permitted to determine that only $70,000 is necessary for the 
care of the pet.  The $30,000 that the court has designated as “excess 
funds” will be disbursed to the parties stipulated in the trust, or the 
controlling pet trust statute will be used in default and will stipulate 
where the funds go.  Section 408 distributes any excess funds to the 
settlor, if then living, or to the settlor’s “successors in interest.”57  
Section 2-907 directs the court to three possible means of determining 
where the excess funds can be distributed: (1) as directed by the 
trust,58 (2) as directed by the transferor’s will,59 or (3) to the 
transferor’s heirs if no taker is produced by the first two means.60 
The language of the excess funds provisions differs slightly 
between the UPC and the UTC.  The excess funds provision of the 
UPC states that “[a c]ourt may reduce the amount of the property 
transferred, if it determines that that amount substantially exceeds the 
amount required for the intended use.”61  The UTC’s excess funds 
provision has the same language; however, it requires a court to 
distribute funds that exceed the amount required for the intended 
use,62 while the UPC requires that the funds “substantially exceed[] 
the amount required for the intended use.”63  Whether this difference 
 
56 See id. § 2-907(c)(4); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(b) (2006). 
57 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(c). 
58 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(2)(i). 
59 Id. § 2-907(c)(2)(ii). 
60 Id. § 2-907(c)(2)(iii). 
61 Id. § 2-907(c)(6). 
62 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(c). 
63 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(6). 
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in language has made an actual difference in practice is unclear.  
There appears to be no discernable difference in analysis when the 
judge is guided by the UPC’s excess funds provision versus the 
UTC’s provision.  Because the ULC and not the legislature drafts the 
uniform codes, there is no legislative history to determine why 
exactly the drafters eliminated the word “substantially” when they 
drafted the UTC. 
For reasons I discuss below, the excess funds provision should be 
removed from both the UPC and the UTC in order to encourage the 
removal of this provision from all state statutes.  Of the forty-four 
states that have a statutory pet trust,64 thirty-six contain an excess 
funds provision.65 
The reasons the eight states excluded the excess funds provision 
may be linked to an effort by local Humane Societies to discourage 
adoption of the provision.  Oregon is an example of this effort.  In 
2001, Oregon passed its first pet trust statute that authorized the 
creation of a pet trust, made a presumption against an honorary 
interpretation, and laid out a method for the court to appoint a person 
to enforce the trust.66  This statute was not based on any uniform 
code, so it noticeably excluded an excess funds provision.67  The 
statute remained as such for several years, but it faced a major change 
when Oregon was considering adopting the UTC in 2005.68  Because 
the UTC includes an excess funds provision,69 Oregon’s pet trust 
statute would have included the provision if it had adopted the UTC 
in its entirety. 
In anticipation of the code’s eventual adoption by the legislature, 
the twelve-person Study Committee was formed in 2002 to review 
existing Oregon trust law and compare it to the UTC.70  The 
 
64 See supra notes 38–43. 
65 Eight state statutes exclude an excess funds provision.  CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212 
(West 2009) (California); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-901 (West 2010) (Colorado); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3555 (West 2010) (Delaware); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28 
(West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-601 (West 2010) (Idaho); OR. REV. STAT. § 
130.185 (2009) (Oregon); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.118.005 to .110 (West 2010) 
(Washington); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11 (West 2009) (Wisconsin). 
66 2001 Or. Laws 636 § 1 (repealed 2005) (formerly codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 
128.308). 
67 See id. 
68 Valerie J. Vollmar, The Oregon Uniform Trust Code and Comments, 42 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). 
69 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(c) (2006). 
70 Vollmar, supra note 68, at 187. 
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Committee sought to maintain current Oregon law as much as 
possible, thereby making modifications mostly to the trust code and 
not to present laws.71  After learning of the modifications made to the 
code in other states and any resulting problems, the Committee 
drafted proposed legislation that was eventually introduced in the 
2005 Oregon Legislature as Senate Bill 275.72 
Although the pet trust statute in force at the time, lacked an excess 
funds provision, the Study Committee’s proposed legislation included 
the provision as stated in the UTC.73  The justification for the 
provision’s inclusion was simply that the Study Committee found no 
reason for retaining property in a pet trust if a judge could determine 
there were excess funds.74  But when the Humane Society of Oregon 
stated that it would oppose the bill unless the provision was removed, 
the provision was omitted.75  This removal occurred through Senate 
Bill 275-3(a) amendments, which were supported by one of the Study 
Committee’s chairs, Professor Susan Gary.76  The main argument 
against the provision, as argued by witnesses testifying before the 
House, was simply that, if people have the desire to leave money for 
their pets and the funds to do so, the courts should enforce their valid 
pet trusts.77  Senate Bill 275, with the (3)(a) amendments, passed both 
legislative houses, whereby a modified version of the UTC’s pet trust 
statute became effective on January 1, 2006.78  Accordingly, 
Oregon’s pet trust statute79 lacks the excess funds provision80 due to 
the Humane Society’s efforts to have the provision excluded. 
 
71 OR. STATE BAR, THE OREGON UNIFORM TRUST CODE: WHAT IT IS AND THE 
EXTENT TO WHICH IT CHANGES OREGON LAW 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.osbar.org/_docs/lawimprove/documents/UTCchanges2-03-05.pdf. 
72 Id. 
73 S. 275, 73d Or. Legis. Ass’y (2005). 
74 OR. STATE BAR, supra note 71, at 9. 
75 Professor Susan Gary, who testified in support of adopting the UTC, said the Oregon 
Humane Society showed up at one of the hearings on the bill and said they would testify 
against the bill if the excess funds provision was not dropped.  Interview with Susan Gary, 
Professor, Univ. of Or. Sch. of Law, in Eugene, Or. (Oct. 15, 2009).  To avoid that 
opposition, the sentence was removed from the bill, and the Oregon Humane Society never 
ended up needing to testify.  Id.  This conversation occurred on March 22, 2005.  Id. 
76 Or. S. 275. 
77 Id. 
78 Vollmar, supra note 68, at 188. 
79 OR. REV. STAT. § 130.185 (2009). 
80 Or. S. 275. 
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IV 
THE LEONA HELMSLEY EXAMPLE 
The pet trust that Leona Helmsley set up for her dog, Trouble, is a 
present-day example of what the excess funds provision can do in 
practice, and it helps illustrate the problems the provision presents.  
Leona Helmsley, or “The Queen of Mean” as many know her, has 
been a household name in the media for many years.  Not only was 
Helmsley married to billionaire Harry Helmsley, the hotel and real 
estate magnate, but her flamboyant attitude brought attention in its 
own right.81  Despite her extreme wealth, Helmsley expressed open 
disdain of taxes, once remarking, “only the little people pay taxes.”82  
This statement turned out to be inaccurate when Helmsley was 
convicted of $1.2 million worth of tax evasion, which she was forced 
to pay, in addition to serving time in prison and on house arrest.83 
Helmsley was also well known for her close relationship to her 
Maltese dog, Trouble.  Helmsley used Trouble in hotel 
advertisements, fed her meals cooked by hotel chefs, walked out of 
restaurants that would not allow Trouble, and relied on her constant 
companion to keep others away.84  She remarked that Trouble was 
her “first bodyguard.”85  Despite this well-known bond, many were 
surprised to learn that Helmsley created a trust worth $12 million for 
Trouble’s care.  Because the trust was created while she was still alive 
(an inter vivos trust), the exact details are unknown because it never 
became a public record.86  What is known, however, is that Helmsley 
knew exactly the level of care she wanted for Trouble, and she sought 
to ensure that such care continued after her death.  Helmsley 
determined that $12 million was the amount of money that would 
ensure that Trouble would live out her existence in the manner to 
which she was accustomed. 
Having expressed her wishes for Trouble in a valid, legally-binding 
document, in addition to providing the funds necessary to complete 
those wishes, it is surprising that there is anything further to discuss 
 
81 Strom, supra note 2. 
82 Catherine Rampell, How Common is Tax Evasion?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/how-common-is-tax-evasion. 
83 Strom, supra note 2. 
84 Manny Fernandez, Multimillionaire Dog Can’t Buy Herself a Friend, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/03/nyregion/03trouble.html. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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regarding Trouble’s pet trust.  However, the excess funds provision87 
permitted a surrogate judge in New York to reject Helmsley’s $12 
million amount.88  Instead, the judge and the executors of Helmsley’s 
estate determined that $2 million was sufficient to provide for 
Trouble’s care and that such a reduction would also reduce estate 
taxes.89 
The excess funds passed to the Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley 
Charitable Trust.90  This change is interesting for several reasons.  
First, while the executors urged the court to reduce the funds for 
Trouble’s care in order to reduce estate taxes, a charitable deduction 
is not permitted when transferring trust property to a charitable 
organization or trust.91  But without the trust return, it is impossible to 
determine whether estate taxes were actually reduced.  More 
importantly, the fact that the funds were not disbursed to the 
executors or trustee directly may imply to the unwary that those 
parties did not have any selfish intentions in asking the court to 
reduce the excess funds.  This may not actually be the case, however.  
Just as Helmsley’s intent regarding the pet trust was seemingly 
ignored by the court, so too was her intent generally ignored 
regarding the interpretation of the charitable trust.  The court 
ultimately determined that Helmsley’s wishes, as expressed in the 
mission statement of the will, were not binding on the court in 
interpreting the document.92  Therefore, the use of the funds in 
Helmsley’s charitable trust was broadly in the trustee’s discretion.93  
While the trustee and executors have widely denied any bias against 
animal causes and organizations, their enforcement of Helmsley’s 
 
87 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1(d) (McKinney 2010).  The excess funds 
provision is preceded by section (b), which ironically states: “Except as expressly provided 
otherwise in the trust instrument, no portion of the principal or income may be converted 
to the use of the trustee or to any use other than for the benefit of all covered animals.”  Id. 
§ 7-8.1(b). 
88 Strom, supra note 2. 
89 Carlisle, supra note 3. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See Karen Matthews, Leona Helmsley’s Fortune Not Going to Dog Charities, Say 
Animal Welfare Groups, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.huffington 
post.com/2009/08/11/leona-helmsleys-fortune-n_n_256303.html. 
93 Id. 
 2010] Making Pet Trusts Instruments of Settlors & Not of Courts 401 
donative documents implies otherwise.94  In the end, only 0.1% of the 
funds left in the charitable trust went to animal organizations.95 
The decrease in funds was permitted partly based upon an affidavit 
from Carl Lekic, the general manager of the Helmsley Sandcastle 
Hotel, who was caring for Trouble at the time of the proceeding.96  
Lekic not only attested to Trouble’s current happiness but also made 
financial projections about what it would realistically cost to continue 
that happiness.97  Lekic stated that “[t]wo million dollars . . . would 
be enough money to pay for Trouble’s maintenance and welfare at the 
highest standards of care for more than 10 years, which is more that 
[sic] twice her reasonably anticipated life expectancy.”98  This 
statement was based upon his calculations that Trouble required about 
$190,000 annually: $60,000 for Lekic’s guardian fee; $100,000 for 
constant security; $8000 for grooming; $3000 for miscellaneous 
expenses; $1200 for food; and between $2500 and $18,000 for 
medical care.99 
Despite lowering the funds left in trust for Trouble, the pooch’s 
expenses have actually gone up since Helmsley was alive.  Due to the 
publicity around Trouble’s pet trust, more than forty death and 
dognapping threats have been reported, requiring Trouble to be 
removed from her Connecticut home and sent to an undisclosed 
 
94 Marissa Heflin, Animal Welfare Organizations Question ‘Donor Intent’ in Leona 
Helmsley Case, PET STYLE NEWS, Aug. 12, 2009, http://www.petproductnews.com 
/headlines/helmsley.aspx. 
95 Helmsley Trustees Misdirecting Funds Meant to Help Dogs, Lawsuit Charges, 
HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.hsus.org/pets/pets_related 
_news_and_events/helmsley_lawsuit.html [hereinafter Helmsley Trustees Misdirecting 
Funds].  Although animal activists across the country initially celebrated when Helmsley’s 
trust and will were mostly revealed to the public, attitudes quickly changed when it 
became clear that very little funds, if any, were going to be donated to animal 
organizations.  The funds that did go to an animal organization went toward training 
seeing-eye-dogs—a service focused on the betterment of humans, not animals.  Heflin, 
supra note 94.  The HSUS and Maddie’s Fund brought suit against the executors and 
trustee for not following the settlor’s intent for the will in August 2009.  Id.  Ultimately, 
whether the executors and trustee were able to use any of the funds designated for Trouble 
and various animal organizations for personal use is uncertain.  It is clear, however, that 
their intent for the trust and will property was somehow enforced in lieu of Helmsley’s, 
and it did not include benefiting animals. 
96 Dareh Gregorian, Screw the Pooch: Leona’s Pup Loses $10M of Trust Fund, N.Y. 
POST, June 16, 2008, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/item_SaKdk6C9oxnN0E 
1mMZ4QuO. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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location.100  She now requires full-time security guards, which cost 
anywhere from $100,000 to $200,000 a year.101  With this annual 
expense, in addition to Trouble’s normal expenses for food, 
veterinary care, and thyroid and kidney medications,102 it is clear that 
Trouble will not live in her usual fashion for long on only $2 
million.103 
V 
THE EXCESS FUNDS PROVISION SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM 
UNIFORM LAWS REGARDING PET TRUSTS 
There are four reasons why the excess funds provision should be 
removed from pet trust statutes: (1) it undermines the general attitude 
of established trusts and estates law in the United States, which allows 
parties to control where their assets go posthumously when a valid, 
legal document is drafted; (2) the settlor is in a better position than the 
court to determine what funds are necessary to satisfy the intended 
use of the trust the settlor created; (3) it could deter the use of pet 
trusts because it decreases the likelihood that the settlor’s wishes for 
his property will be followed; and (4) it furthers an outdated attitude 
toward companion animals that studies reveal most Americans now 
disagree with. 
A.  Excess Funds Provisions Are Discordant with the Attitude of 
Trusts and Estates Law Generally 
The excess funds provision is discordant with American law on 
trusts and estates.  Since the formation of the United States, its laws 
 
100 Carlisle, supra note 3. 
101 Id. 
102 Fernandez, supra note 84. 
103 In 2007, at Helmsley’s death, Trouble was eight years old.  Id.  The average Maltese 
lives an average of twelve to fourteen years.  Maltese Dogs Life Span, BUZZLE.COM, 
http://www.buzzle.com/articles/maltese-dogs-life-span.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).  
This means that in all likelihood, Trouble is not going to live more than another seven 
years.  Although it was likely traumatic for Trouble to have lost Helmsley considering 
their bond, seven years still seems like a plausible life span for Trouble considering the 
quality of care she has had her entire life—top-of-the-line food, medications for any 
ailments, and protection from the elements.  For example, if her expenses are around 
$250,000 a year (including security, food, grooming, and veterinarian services), then the 
trustee would spend $1,750,000 throughout Trouble’s life.  The $2 million remaining in 
trust for Trouble would therefore be sufficient to cover her minimum expenses.  It still 
seems unlikely, however, that there would be funds remaining to cover the luxuries that 
Trouble used to enjoy while Helmsley was alive. 
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regarding private property, ownership, and inheritance have set it 
apart from many other countries.  The notion that inheritance is an 
absolute right is a belief so steeped in American history that few think 
about the fact that many countries and philosophers disapprove of 
inheritance entirely. 
Central to the belief that property can be left to devisees is the 
notion that the decedent himself has full control over where his assets 
will go after death.  The concept that a person can leave property to 
any beneficiary for whatever legal purpose he chooses is a foundation 
in the law regarding intestacy and wills.  This right was eventually 
memorialized in the Restatement of Property104 and was reinforced in 
American law when the Supreme Court held the right to be a separate, 
identifiable “‘stick[] in the bundle,’” stating that a revocation of such 
right constitutes a compensable taking.105  In other words, there is a 
constitutional right to devise property.106 
Today, the law is explicit in allowing the testator or settlor to 
determine what will be done with his property after death.107  The 
Restatement of Property, for example, provides that “[t]he controlling 
consideration in determining the meaning of a [will or trust] is the 
donor’s intention.”108  That intention is “given effect to the maximum 
extent allowed by law.”109  This is an extremely large grant of power, 
giving property owners an almost unlimited right to choose where 
their property goes and for what it can be used.110  The comments to 
the Restatement emphasize that the courts should be involved with 
donative documents only to the extent that they are facilitating and 
not regulating.111  The role of judges is to make a reliable 
determination regarding the settlor’s intent rather than to decide how 
they believe the settlor’s property should be allocated.112  As other 
sections of the Restatement reveal, the judicial role had to be 
narrowly defined because courts often had to determine the intentions 
 
104 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. c (2003) [hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT]. 
105 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
106 Id. 
107 American law treats the intent of settlors with as much regard as the intent of 
testators. 
108 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 104, § 10.1. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. § 10.1 cmt. a. 
111 Id. § 10.1 cmt. c. 
112 Id. 
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of a settlor when there was no document in place or when the 
document was ambiguous.113  When the document does not clearly 
reveal the settlor’s intent, the court must infer the settlor’s intent from 
other evidence and the surrounding circumstances.  When the court 
must make such an inference, there is a greater propensity for a judge 
to inject his own personal wishes, or those of the executors, in 
substitution for the decedent’s wishes.  Ironically, the excess funds 
provision permits a judge to inject his own wishes when there is a 
valid donative document and the document is not ambiguous.  A 
perfectly valid and clear pet trust is still subject to the excess funds 
provision. 
Overall, the law ignores whether the settlor’s distribution of his 
assets is reasonable, fair, or the “right” thing to do.114  American 
courts have held for years that the settlor may decide who will receive 
his assets, in what amounts, and under what conditions.  A settlor may 
leave more money to one child than another or even exclude one child 
entirely in favor of another.115  A settlor may condition the bequest 
upon a requirement that a child marry someone of a particular 
religion,116 or even condition the bequest upon a requirement that the 
beneficiary not smoke or drink.117  Courts have traditionally honored 
a decedent’s wishes whenever possible.  There are rare times when 
this is not possible, such as when the trust purpose is illegal, when the 
living suffer a great hardship due to the settlor’s trust intentions, or 
when the settlor’s wishes appear to be extraordinarily wasteful.118  A 
settlor’s wishes might be seen as extraordinarily wasteful, for 
example, if they include the destruction of a valuable piece of art 
upon his death.119 
Just as a judge is not permitted to inject his own wishes into the 
trust, so too is the judge not permitted to consider the wishes of other 
parties to the trust or even the public good.  Many people, for 
example, did not agree with the amount of money left in trust for 
 
113 See, e.g., id. § 10.2. 
114 Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 792–93 
(2009). 
115 96 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Intentional Omission of Child from Will § 3 
(2007). 
116 See, e.g., In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250–51 (Pa. 1967). 
117 See, e.g., Holmes v. Conn. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 103 A. 640, 642 (Conn. 1918). 
118 Smolensky, supra note 114, at 794. 
119 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 832 (2005). 
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Helmsley’s dog, Trouble.120  As the New York Times revealed the 
details of Helmsley’s donative documents after her death, the reader 
commentary on the articles was particularly revealing of these 
opinions.  One comment said, for example, that to “leave your dog 
$12 million while leaving grandchildren $5 million is astoundingly 
ridiculous.”121  Some people claimed that her money could have been 
better spent on the indigent population.122  Others claimed animals 
are incapable of enjoying things that people consider luxuries.123 
While other entities could greatly benefit from the $12 million left 
in trust for Trouble, that consideration is not relevant in the American 
estate system.  If that were a permissible inquiry, rarely would there 
be the inheritances that happen every day in this country.  A court 
could routinely question who needs that money most, and funds 
would almost always be directed to the family members most in need, 
the homeless or mentally ill population, or medical research.  Yet 
America has never functioned in this way.  This presents the question: 
why is it that in the area of testamentary gifts to animals, courts are 
allowed to decide who could better use a decedent’s estate?  Whether 
it is morally right to spend money to allow a dog to live in luxury 
when there are humans who are struggling just to get by is a question 
that has no place in determining how a pet trust is enforced.  Under 
the laws of this country, no court has “authority to question the 
wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness” of a settlor’s intention for his 
trust so long as it is legal.124  Lavish or not, Americans enjoy the 
freedom to spend their money as they wish, and that ought to include 
the right to spend more money on pets than others might deem 
socially responsible or reasonable. 
By ignoring the law’s foundational premise that donative 
documents be enforced per the settlor’s wishes, the excess funds 
 
120 For example, see the comments left on an article about Helmsley’s pet trust on 
Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees blog on CNN.com.  Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch: The Legal 
Battle Over Trust Funds for Pets, CNN, Sept. 22, 2008, http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2008 
/09/22/rich-bitch-the-legal-battle-over-trust-funds-for-pets/.  There were many different 
viewpoints, but most could be summarized by one commenter’s remark: “What a waste, 
didn’t she know that children are starving in this country also.”  Id. (comment by Brenda 
Harris, Sept. 22, 2008, 10:04 PM). 
121 Sewell Chan, Leona Helmsley’s Unusual Last Will, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/29/leona-helmsleys-unusual-last-will/?apage 
=3#comment-10762 (comment, Aug. 29, 2007, 6:52 PM). 
122 Id. (comment, Aug. 29, 2007, 10:02 PM). 
123 Id. (comment, Aug. 29, 2007, 5:10 PM). 
124 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 104, § 10.1 cmt. c (2003). 
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provision opens the door for courts to ignore settlor intent in donative 
documents not pertaining to animals.  The widely publicized 
enforcement, or more accurately unenforcement, of Leona Helmsley’s 
estate appears to have tested the waters as to whether courts will be 
able to ignore settlor intent in the future.  The court’s action relating 
to Helmsley’s estate caused Wayne Pacelle, president and CEO of the 
Humane Society of the United States, to note with concern that such 
court decisions endanger all donative documents,125 not just those 
regarding animals: “Every person with a will or estate—and every 
charity that relies on bequest income—should be profoundly 
concerned . . . .”126  The president of Maddie’s Fund, another animal 
welfare organization that was negatively affected by the interpretation 
given to Helmsley’s estate, remarked similarly that “[t]he ignoring of 
donor intent in this country has become an unspoken national 
shame.”127 
It could be argued, however, that trust and estate law does limit the 
control of the “dead hand” in several ways and that perhaps the excess 
funds provision is consonant with those limitations.  One example is 
the policy behind the RAP, which is one of the bases underlying the 
traditional treatment of pet trusts that was changed by enactment of 
statutory pet trusts.  The RAP stipulates that no interest is valid unless 
it must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life in being 
at the creation of the interest.128  The policy for this rule is to limit a 
decedent’s “dead hand” from controlling property well into future 
generations.  The policy behind the RAP and the RAP itself, however, 
have actually been fading out of American law for many years.  Since 
the mid-1950s, lawyers and legislatures have heavily debated the 
continued need for the RAP, leading to expansive reform and, in 
some states, abolition of the rule entirely.129  This is one example of 
the larger debate among lawyers and legislatures as to how long the 
 
125 The quotes by Wayne Pacelle and Rich Avanzino, the president of Maddie’s Fund, 
were said in response to the court decision not to follow the mission statement of 
Helmsley’s will, which is a separate issue from her pet trust.  The quotes are used here, 
however, because both court decisions regarding Helmsley’s estate entail a frustration of 
settlor intent. 
126 Helmsley Trustees Misdirecting Funds, supra note 95. 
127 Id. 
128 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. 1942). 
129 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 697 (7th ed. 2005). 
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“dead hand” should be allowed to control and whether any limitation 
on its control should exist.130 
The ULC has greatly decreased the prominence of the RAP in 
today’s trust and estate law.  In 1986, the ULC passed the Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities,131 which adopted an artificial 
wait-and-see period of ninety years.132  This change validates 
interests that have not vested and would otherwise be void under 
common law if the interest vests within ninety years of its creation.  
As of 2010, this uniform rule has been adopted by thirty states,133 and 
the remaining states have all modified the RAP or abolished it 
entirely.  By increasing the RAP to ninety years, it rarely affects trusts 
as it once did and makes the measuring life of almost any animal 
imaginable certain to vest within the ninety-year period.  As trust and 
estate expert Jesse Dukeminier once noted, the RAP cannot “survive 
[ninety] years in desuetude.”134  Thus, substantively, the RAP is no 
longer an issue for pet trusts.  More importantly, the concern 
regarding the length of time a “dead hand” can control property is a 
nonissue with most pet trusts because the average pet trust will last 
for only a few years.  The vast majority of pet trusts in the United 
States are set up for the care of cats and dogs, which are the main 
animals that Americans keep as pets.135  Due to the average lifespan 
of a cat or dog, most pet trusts are likely to last only five or ten years 
before the animal dies. 
The fact that most pet trusts will exist for such a short amount of 
time only further illustrates why the excess funds provision is 
unnecessary.  At the time of the animal’s death, the amount of funds 
not used for the animal’s care is precisely known.  Rather than 
waiting a few years to learn the exact amount of money left over, the 
excess funds provision allows judges, years before the animal’s death, 
to instead guess the amount of funds in excess and then disburse those 
funds to other parties.  While this is inconsistent with settlor intent, 
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there could also be dire consequences for the animal if the court’s 
lower approximation ends up being incorrect.  If the trust runs out of 
assets to provide for the pet’s care before the pet dies, the caretaker is 
left with three realistic options: (1) pay for the animal out of his own 
funds, (2) give the animal to a shelter to hopefully adopt out, or (3) 
euthanize the animal.  It is therefore more prudent to take the chance 
that some funds are unnecessarily tied up for a short time than to take 
the chance that a caretaker is left with insufficient funds to care for 
the animal beneficiary. 
Overall, American law supports the general contention that a 
settlor, and only a settlor, can widely control what becomes of his 
own assets after death.  Neither the RAP, nor any other American 
law, proves otherwise.  By ignoring the intention of the settlor and 
substituting the intention of executors or judges, the excess funds 
provision is discordant with the general attitude of American trust and 
estate law. 
B.  The Settlor Is in the Best Position to Determine the Funds 
Necessary for the Trust’s Intended Purpose 
In addition to being discordant with American law, ignoring settlor 
intent is also illogical because the settlor is in the best position to 
determine the funds necessary for the trust’s intended purpose.  By 
allowing judges to ignore the settlor’s wishes, the excess funds 
provision implies that there are other parties who are better equipped 
than the settlor to know how the settlor’s assets should be spent.  Yet, 
it is the settlor who has lived with the pet and come to know what 
food the animal likes, what toys the animal likes, and what 
environment is most conducive to the animal’s well-being.  It is the 
settlor and not any other party who has established a lifestyle to which 
the animal has become accustomed, and therefore it is the settlor who 
should determine how the animal continues to live after the settlor 
dies. 
When other parties are permitted to alter the amount of money left 
in trust for an animal’s care, what they are really doing is altering the 
intended purpose of the trust.  For example, when the judge chopped 
Trouble’s trust down to $2 million, it appears that the judge was 
indirectly defining the intended purpose of the trust as providing for 
the necessities of the pet.  Certainly, the judge was not viewing the 
purpose of the trust as providing for the continuance of Trouble’s 
accustomed lifestyle because, if he had, he would have kept intact the 
$12 million amount Helmsley chose.  While $2 million is still much 
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more than what the average American pet requires for its care, this 
amount does not appear to be in excess of Trouble’s necessities, 
considering her previously mentioned security costs.  By leaving $12 
million to provide for Trouble’s care, Helmsley’s intended purpose of 
the trust was to provide Trouble with an accustomed lifestyle under 
any foreseen or unforeseen circumstances. 
C.  Excess Funds Provisions Could Deter Use of Pet Trusts 
Part of the misalignment regarding the intended purpose of a pet 
trust, as mentioned above, is occurring because the excess funds 
provision incentivizes certain parties to bring suits challenging the 
amount of property in trust if they believe they will receive any of the 
court-determined excess funds.  Not only do many settlors decide 
quite carefully what parties they do and do not want to receive their 
money after death, but many settlors also consider whether their 
donative documents are drafted in a way that will minimize conflict 
among their loved ones.  Major headlines that cover stories like Leona 
Helmsley’s pet trust notify present and potential settlors of the 
possible externalities of the excess funds provision, especially those 
who are contemplating leaving a large amount of money in trust to 
their pet.  Settlors who are aware of these side effects, who seek to 
minimize family conflict after their death, and who desire that a 
certain amount of their assets actually be spent on the care of their 
beloved pets may be dissuaded from using a statutory pet trust as their 
means of providing for their pets. 
In an attempt to avoid this scenario, many practitioners have come 
up with ways to draft around the provision’s externalities, including 
drafting in a “poison pill” or a “goose egg.”136  A poison pill is a 
clause that stipulates which beneficiaries will receive any “excess 
funds” that the court determines are not necessary for the trust’s 
purpose,137 thereby taking away the discretion of the court or the 
necessity of using a statute to decide.  A more successful clause is the 
goose egg—a maneuver typically used in a “pour-over” provision of a 
will, which is a provision that pours the decedent’s assets into an 
already existing trust.138  Such a clause states that any party who 
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contests an amount in the will as a whole or an amount left in trust 
shall receive no further funds from the decedent’s estate.139  While 
these maneuvers may sometimes be effective in avoiding a challenge 
to the amount of money left in trust for a pet, there are no guarantees 
that they will truly avoid the consequences of the excess funds 
provision.  Additionally, attorneys should not be forced to draft 
around a problematic provision in their state’s pet trust statute.  By 
removing the excess funds provision, the ULC could ensure that 
people are not dissuaded from using pet trusts as a way to provide for 
their pets’ care.  While there are other methods available, the pet trust 
is an important option for pet owners and attorneys as the state 
statutes have made the creation of pet trusts fairly simple and 
straightforward.  The statutes ensure that people of modest means are 
not forced to design expensive and elaborate estate plans.  This makes 
pet trusts an option for the many owners who do not have the unusual 
amount of money that Leona Helmsley had but still wish to provide 
for their pets. 
D.  Excess Funds Provisions Carry Outdated Attitudes Toward 
Animals 
The excess funds provision also furthers an outdated attitude 
toward animals that many Americans increasingly disagree with.  By 
allowing courts to ignore the settlor’s intent in pet trusts while 
generally upholding settlor intent in other areas of trusts, the excess 
funds provision implies that companion animals are not worthy of 
inheritance.  By reallocating a decedent’s assets to decrease the 
amount given for the care of a decedent’s companion animal and 
increase the amount given to a human executor or beneficiary, judges 
are permitted to make the value judgment that animal welfare is not a 
cause worthy of a decedent’s assets. 
Viewing animals as simple property and nothing more is an 
antiquated view that has been disappearing in the law, in the 
American psyche, and in the way Americans choose to spend their 
hard-earned money.  For at least the first hundred years of American 
history, animals were primarily owned for their economic utility.  
Dogs were used to herd sheep, cats were used to kill mice on the 
family farm, and horses were used to pull buggies.  This explains why 
the law has traditionally treated companion animals as nothing more 
than property, giving them the same status as a table or a deck of 
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cards.  But since the beginning of the twentieth century, the use of 
pets has greatly changed, and certain animals are now primarily 
owned for emotional utility.  Most Americans own dogs not because 
they are helpful in herding other animals but because they are great 
companions—because they are waiting by the door when their owners 
walk in after a stressful day at work. 
Every year, Americans bring more pets into their families.  In fact, 
Americans own approximately 77.5 million dogs and 93.6 million 
cats.140  That is roughly eight million more cats and dogs than were 
found in the previous year’s study.141  Additionally, more Americans 
are pet owners than are parents.142 
The bond between the average pet owner and his pet is also 
strengthening.  For the majority of today’s cat and dog owners, the pet 
is actually considered part of the family, akin to a child or other close 
family member.143  One report claims that seventy-nine percent of 
pet-owning Americans actually share their bed each night with their 
pets,144 which is inarguably a testament to the bond between a human 
and an animal.  America’s increasing affection for its animals and its 
view of such pets as family has fueled the current demand for statutes 
enforcing pet trusts. 
Additionally, the amount of money that Americans want to spend 
on their animals has also greatly increased.  While America spent a 
whopping $17 billion on pets in 1994, that number is measly in 
comparison to the amount spent in 2009: $45.5 billion.145  When pet 
owners are spending this kind of money on their pets while they are 
alive, it is no surprise that so many Americans want to continue to 
spend large sums of money on their animals after death. 
While other areas of the law have been recognizing this change in 
attitude toward animals,146 albeit rather slowly, an excess funds 
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provision does not reflect this relevant attitude.  Ed Sayres, president 
and CEO of the ASPCA, felt the frustrating effect of this, stating that 
“[t]here has been a sea change in recent years in how we treat animals 
and the Helmsley trustees don’t understand that change.”147  As the 
country’s attitudes toward animals have evolved over time, it is time 
the law reflects that change of opinion, both generally and in the 
specific removal of the excess funds provision. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, when more Americans are pet owners than parents and 
more homes have pets than those that do not, cats and dogs have 
become our best friends and family.  While Americans have spent an 
enormous amount of money on their animals while alive—often 
buying them birthday gifts and Halloween costumes—they also seek 
to leave money for their pets’ care after their death.  Because of this 
demand, forty-four states statutorily allow for an enforceable pet trust.  
All forty-four state statutes track the language of a uniform pet trust 
statute to some degree, explaining the existence of an excess funds 
provision in thirty-four of those statutes.  Because the uniform pet 
trust statutes have been so influential in how state legislatures draft 
their statutes, the ULC should remove the excess funds provision 
from the UTC and the UPC in its next round of amendments.  This 
change will trickle down to the state statutes regarding pet trusts.  The 
effect of this change will be that trustees will be required to disburse 
funds for the care of pets as the settlors wish.  Upon the death of the 
animal, any amount of funds that was actually in excess will be 
known and can then be disbursed to other parties as the controlling 
statute dictates.  As noted, both section 408 of the UTC and section 2-
907 of the UPC stipulate where excess funds should be directed. 
In addition to removing the excess funds provision, the drafters of 
the ULC amendments should also include subsequent comments 
reflecting why they removed the provision.  By laying out the 
arguments of this Comment, in addition to any other authorities the 
drafters use, the thirty-four states should easily be encouraged over 
time to remove the provision.  Additionally, the eight states without a 
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pet trust statute should be encouraged by the trend in the law to adopt 
an enforceable pet trust statute without an excess funds provision. 
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